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Abstract 
In this paper we study, having as theoretical reference the economic model of 
crime (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973), which are the socioeconomic and 
demographic determinants of crime in Spain paying attention on the role of 
provincial peculiarities. We estimate a crime equation using a panel dataset of 
Spanish provinces (NUTS3) for the period 1993 to 1999 employing the GMM-
system estimator. Empirical results suggest that lagged crime rate and clear-up 
rate are correlated to all typologies of crime rate considered. Property crimes are 
better explained by socioeconomic variables (GDP per capita, GDP growth rate 
and percentage of population with high school and university degree), while 
demographic factors reveal important and significant influences, in particular for 
crimes against the person. These results are obtained using an instrumental 
variable approach that takes advantage of the dynamic properties of our dataset 
to control for both measurement errors in crime data and joint endogeneity of 
the explanatory variables. 
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Resumen 
Este trabajo estudia, teniendo como referencia teórica el modelo económico del 
crimen (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973), cuáles son los determinantes 
socioeconómicos del crimen en España, prestando especial atención a las 
peculiaridades provinciales. Estimamos una ecuación de los determinantes del 
crimen usando el estimador GMM-system para los datos de panel de las 
provincias españolas durante el periodo 1993-1999. Los resultados empíricos 
sugieren que la tasa de crimen retardada y la tasa de crímenes esclarecidos están 
correlacionadas con todas las tipologías de crímenes consideradas. Los crímenes 
contra la propiedad parecen estar mejor explicados por variables 
socioeconómicas (PIB per capita, crecimiento del PIB y porcentaje de la 
población con estudios medios y superiores), mientras que los factores 
demográficos revelan influencias importantes y significativas para los crímenes 
contra las personas. Estos resultados se obtienen utilizando variables 
instruméntales que aprovechan las propiedades dinámicas de los datos para 
controlar los errores de medida en los datos criminales y la posible 
endogeneidad de las variables explicativas. 
 
Palabras clave: Crimen; Factores socioeconómicos; Factores demográficos; 
Datos de panel. 
Clasificación JEL: I2; J24; K42 
  01. Introduction 
 
During the last three decades the economics of crime has become a new 
field for economic investigation, in particular due to the fact that over the same 
period of time there has been an outstanding increase in criminal activities in 
many western countries, as confirmed by several empirical studies. The large 
majority of empirical studies consider common law countries: United States 
(Ehrlich, 1973; Freeman, 1996; Glaeser, 1999, Grogger, 1995 and 1998; 
Lochner, 2004) and United Kingdom (Wolpin, 1978; Machin and Meghir, 
2000), even if during the last five years a growing number of works analyzes the 
determinants of crime for European countries such as Germany (Entorf and 
Spenger, 2000) and Italy (Marselli and Vannini, 1997; Buonanno and Leonida, 
2005) or for Latin American countries: Colombia (Gaviria, 2000) or Argentina 
(Garcette, 2004). 
The economics literature on crime sprung from the seminal contribution by 
Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973). In 1968 Becker presents a paper that 
radically changes the way of thinking about criminal behaviour. Becker builds 
the first model of criminal choice, stressing that “some individuals become 
criminals because of the financial and other rewards from crime compared to 
legal work, taking account of the likelihood of apprehension and conviction, and 
the severity of punishment” (p. 176). Criminal choice is not determined by 
mental illness or bad attitudes, but it is made on the basis of a maximization 
problem in which agents compare the costs and the benefits of legal and illegal 
activities taking into account the probability of being arrested and punished and 
the expected returns from crime. 
Since the beginning of 80s, Becker's paper opens the door to a new field of 
empirical research whose main purpose is to verify and study the socioeconomic 
variables that affect crime. The economics of crime interacts with different and 
  1heterogeneous fields (i.e. sociology, criminology, psychology, geography and 
demography) and it is closely related to poverty, social exclusion, wage and 
income inequality, cultural and family background, level of education and other 
economic and sociodemographic factors that may affect individual's propensity 
to commit crimes such as age, gender and urbanization. 
Despite this evidence and a growing concern about the relationship 
between crime and socioeconomic and demographic variables, Spain’s criminal 
activity has received little attention and remains largely neglected by the 
economics of crime literature,
1 while it exists an increasing concern in society 
about crimes, partly motivated by the spectacular increase in gender violence 
over the last years. 
Hence, the objective of this paper is to study the socioeconomic and 
sociodemographic determinants of crime for Spanish provinces. Having as 
theoretical reference the economic model of crime (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 
1973), we test which are the socio-economic determinants of crime in Spain 
paying attention on the role of provincial peculiarities. In particular, we use 
panel data techniques for 46 Spanish provinces over the period 1993 to 1999.
2
Our paper differs from the existing literature in four ways. First, to our 
knowledge is the first paper on crime determinants in Spain that uses provincial 
data, this allows us to better capture the nature of crime given that criminal 
activities are related to a specific area and its characteristics.
3 Second, we 
explicitly consider in our analysis demographic and urban factors. After 
controlling for GDP and other economic variables, we are able to isolate the 
“pure” effect of variables such as age, gender and urbanization. Furthermore, we 
analyze whether and to which extent immigrants could be related to crime, as 
                                                 
1 Although using a completely different approach, Rodríguez Andrés (2003) and Bandrés and 
Diez-Ticio (1998) represent few notable exceptions. 
2 See the data section for more details on the time span and the provinces finally chosen. 
3 For instance, the activities of police forces in Spain are organized at a provincial level. 
  2this is a perception shared by part of society.
4 Third, we explicitly account for 
dynamics in criminal activities. We estimate a dynamic model of provincial 
crime rates using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methodology. This 
allows us to control for unobserved province-specific effects, the joint 
endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables of crime, and the existence of 
measurement errors afflicting in particular the crime data. Controlling for joint 
endogeneity is extremely important in order to obtain consistent estimates of the 
effect of socioeconomic and demographic variables on crime rates. Finally, the 
use of panel data allows us to control for the effect of unobserved variables that 
can be considered as province-specific effects, as systematic measurement errors 
of crime rate. By controlling for these specific effects, we are able to reduce the 
estimation bias due to the underreporting of crime. Fourth, differently from 
previous studies on crime in Spain that use the overall crime rate to measure the 
level of criminal activity, we separate the crime measure into two broad crime 
types: property crimes and crimes against the person. Furthermore, by using the 
classification of Spanish Home Office (Ministerio del Interior, MIR), we are 
even able to separate the crime measure in serious crimes (called “delitos”) and 
in minor crimes (called “faltas”). This approach allows us to avoid aggregation 
bias, as stressed by Cherry and List (2002) “it is inappropriate to pool crime 
types into a single decision model...much of the existing empirical estimates 
suffers from aggregation bias” (p. 81).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the main 
characteristics of crime rates in Spain. Section 3 presents our dataset and 
discusses the potential factors of crime. After illustrating the empirical 
procedure in Section 4, results are reported and interpreted in Section 5. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
4 For instance, the European Popular Party states, in its political program referring to EU 
policies, the need to increase protection of European citizens using common policies in fields 
such as immigration, right of asylum and help for refugees to effectively combat cross-border 
crime and terrorism at European level. 
  32. A few stylized facts about Spain's crime rates 
 
In 1996, 1.48 millions crimes were recorded by Spanish police. On the 
basis of the latest official statistics, the trend of crime in Spain can be depicted 
as in Figure 1. Over the period 1993-1999 Spain has experienced a steadily and 
sharply increase in the total crime rate passing from 4 to 4.7 offences per 100 
inhabitants. 











































Note: Own elaboration using data from the Spanish Home Office (MIR). 
 
The bulk of crimes are offences against property that account for more than 
80% of all crimes, while crimes against the person represent almost 10% of total 
crimes as depicted in Figure 2. 
Table 1 shows the clear-up rates, defined as the ratio of the number of 
crimes cleared by police to the total number of crimes reported, for both 
property crimes and crimes against the person. In 1993 the clearance rate for 
property crimes was 13.4% and increased to 15% in 1999, also the clear-up rate 
  4for crimes against the person shows an increasing trend passing from 74.7% in 
1993 to 85% in 1999. 
 
Figure 2 - Composition of crime rates by typology of crime 
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Note: Own elaboration using data from the Spanish Home Office (MIR). 
 
Table 1 - Clear-up rates (1993-1999) 
  Total crime  Property crime  Crime against Person 
1993  23.94% 13.44%  74.72% 
1994  24.40% 13.18%  76.02% 
1995  25.68% 13.93%  79.05% 
1996  25.42% 14.22%  79.97% 
1997  26.94% 14.60%  81.85% 
1998  27.23% 14.45%  83.28% 
1999  28.06% 15.06%  85.02% 
Note: Own elaboration using data from the Spanish Home Office (MIR). 
 
Following the classification from MIR we distinguish between two types of 
crimes. First, those crimes that can imply severe penalties (for instance, prison) 
for the offender: called “delitos” (hereafter serious crimes); second, those crimes 
that can imply a less severe penalty (payment of fines, etc): called “faltas” 
(hereafter minor crimes). The different nature of both types of crimes seems to 
  5indicate that the study of the determinants of crime should be done for both 
types separately, as we do in our analysis. Table 2 presents the incidence of 
serious crimes and minor crimes on the overall number of crimes (defined as the 
sum of serious crimes and minor crimes) over the period 1993 to 1999. It is 
extremely interesting to notice that for which concerns crimes against the person 
the incidence of minor crimes is around 90%, while for property crimes the 
percentage of serious crimes on the total was more than 60% in 1993 but 
decreased to 53% in 1999; the same holds for total crimes. 
 
Table 2 – Serious crimes (delitos) and minor crimes (faltas) 
  Overall Crimes  Property Crimes  Crimes against the person 
 Delitos  + 
Faltas  %Delitos %Faltas Delitos + 
Faltas  %Delitos %Faltas Delitos + 
Faltas  %Delitos %Faltas
1993  1,484,152 60.68% 39.32%  1,249,967 62.40% 37.60% 124,003 11.65% 88.35% 
1994  1,504,104 57.67% 42.33%  1,250,637 59.53% 40.47% 140,711 10.19% 89.81% 
1995  1,557,216 56.65% 43.35%  1,287,151 58.87% 41.13% 153,637  8.23%  91.77% 
1996  1,659,255 54.86% 45.14%  1,388,831 56.67% 43.33% 155,188  8.21%  91.79% 
1997  1,702,943 53.48% 46.52%  1,401,292 55.66% 44.34% 112,251 13.01% 86.99% 
1998  1,741,614 52.14% 47.86%  1,427,488 54.08% 45.92% 115,201 14.87% 85.13% 
1999  1,756,496 51.68% 48.32%  1,439,203 53.75% 46.25% 189,317  9.48%  90.52% 
Note: Own elaboration using data from the Spanish Home Office. 
 
3. Data and potential factors of crime 
 
In this section we provide an extensive discussion about the data used in 
our empirical analysis and about the potential determinants of crime. Our panel 
dataset comprises annual observations from 46 Spanish provinces (NUTS3)
5 
over the period 1993 to 1999. Crime data, that represent the dependent variable, 
                                                 
5 Spain has 52 provinces. We do not include in our sample the three provinces of the Basque 
Country (Álava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya) and Girona (Catalunya) because the existence of its 
own police forces and, therefore, crime figures in those provinces are not included in the 
official data base of the Spanish Home Office. We also exclude the autonomous Spanish 
cities in North Africa (Ceuta and Melilla) because of lack of information for many of the 
variables used in this study. 
  6are taken from Home Office Statistics. We use the number of total crimes, the 
number of total crimes against property and against the person normalized by 
population, taken from Spanish Statistics Bureau (INE). Furthermore, as 
discussed in the previous section, in the second part of our empirical analysis, 
we distinguish between serious crimes and minor crimes. 
The explanatory variables are separated into three groups: deterrence 
variables, sociodemographic variables and socioeconomic variables. 
Deterrence variables (i.e clear-up rate, probability of apprehension and 
severity of punishment) determine the expected returns from crime. The 
deterrence variable used is the clear-up rate (Clear-up) since this is the only 
deterrence variable for Spain available at provincial level. The clearance rate for 
each offence group was obtained from MIR. 
We include three demographic variables in our analysis that are likely to be 
correlated with crime. These variables, taken from INE, are: the percentage of 
men aged 15-29 years (YMale), the share of population living in provincial 
capital (Capital) and the share of foreigners (Foreign). Young men are said to be 
more prone to engage in criminal activities than the rest of the population, this 
means that the participation to crime is higher at the initial stage of adulthood. 
(Freeman, 1991; Grogger, 1998). Recent studies (Entorf and Spengler, 2000; 
Entorf and Winker, 2001; Buonanno, 2005) have included the percentage of 
foreigners as a possible determinant of crime. In particular, illegal immigrants 
are more likely to be engaged in crime because they are not eligible for regular 
works. Due to the fact that data on irregular immigrants are not available we use 
the percentage of legal immigrants to proxy the phenomenon. We also consider 
the share of population living in provincial capital. It is well documented that 
there is more crime in big cities compared to small cities or rural areas (Glaeser 
and Sacerdote, 1999). In particular, returns form crime may be higher and the 
probability of arrest may be lower in urban areas. 
  7We complete our dataset by including a set of socioeconomic variables: the 
GDP per capita at 1995 constant prices (GDP) taken from INE, the growth rate 
in the GDP (Growth) taken from INE, the unemployment rate (Unemp) taken 
from INE and the share of population with high school and university degree 
(Edu) taken from IVIE (Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas). 
Following the analysis made by Ehrlich (1973) we can consider the GDP per 
capita and the growth rate of the GDP as proxies for the general level of 
prosperity in the provinces, then as indicators of illegal income opportunities. 
An other economic factor that affects crime is unemployment. It exists the 
general belief that unemployment and crime are positively correlated. The 
existence of a casual link between unemployment and crime has been widely 
investigated in the past, even if the strength of this relationship remains 
ambiguous both in its nature and in its robustness. If legal income opportunities 
are less lucrative than potential gains from crime activity, individuals will be 
more prone to be engaged in crime. Since unemployment may reduce legal 
returns from work, it could exist a substitution effect that induces agents to 
commit more crime. From a pure theoretical perspective unemployment may be 
a determinant of crime, but the existing empirical literature fails to reach a 
consensus on the relationship between unemployment and crime, see Chiricos 
(1987), Freeman (1999) and Masciandaro (1999) for a complete review of the 
empirical literature. 
Education may affect the decision to engage in criminal activities through 
several channels. First, higher levels of educational attainment are associated 
with higher returns in the labour market, increasing the opportunity cost of 
criminal behaviour. Second, education may alter personal preferences in a way 
that affects decisions to engage in crime. In particular education may have a sort 
of “civilization” effect. Fajnzylber et al. (2002) suggest that education, 
incorporating a civic component, may increase the individual's moral stance, and 
then affect the individuals’ perception of crime. Usher (1997) stresses that 
  8education perpetuates the values of society, enculturates people to serve their 
communities, and promotes the virtues of hard work and honesty. Furthermore, 
as noted by Lochner and Moretti (2004) schooling generates benefits beyond the 
private return received by individual. Finally, education also increases the cost 
associated with incarceration, since more educated individuals will experience 
greater losses in earnings while in jail. 
Finally, we consider dynamics in delinquency. In fact, past experience in 
criminal activity affects in several ways the decision to commit a crime (Sah, 
1991; Glaeser et al., 1996; Fajnzylber et al., 2002); in other words, higher crime 
today is associated with higher crime tomorrow (i.e. persistence over time). 
Criminals can learn-by-doing and acquire an adequate criminal know-how level; 
this acquisition, in turn, makes the costs of carrying out criminal acts to decrease 
over time (Case and Katz, 1991). Convicted criminals have fewer opportunities 
of legal employment and a lower expected wage (Grogger, 1995). These 
arguments strongly suggest the possibility of criminal hysteresis or inertia. 
 
4. The Empirical procedure 
 
Starting from the theoretical framework, based on Becker (1968) and 
Ehrlich (1973), we propose a dynamic panel data econometric model to test the 
hypothesis of the economic model of crime (ECM) for Spanish provinces. The 
econometric specification of our empirical model, that we use to analyze the 
socioeconomic and demographic determinants of crime, is the following: 
t i t i t i t i t i X CRIME CRIME , , 1 , , ε β η η + + + + = − ,                                (1) 
where the subscripts i and t represent province and time period, respectively; ηi 
is a province fixed effect, ηt is a time effect, Xi,t is the set of explanatory 
variables defined in the previous section and εi,t is the error term. 
  9From an econometric perspective, there are several estimation problems 
that may arise in estimating these empirical models. First, using a panel data set 
it is well-known that OLS coefficients are biased both in the case that 
unobservable province-specific effects (ηi) are statistically significant, and in the 
case that regressors and these effects are correlated. Second, as discussed in the 
previous section, there exists a significant relationship between crime rates in t 
and t-1; for this reason, we include the lagged dependent variable (CRIMEi,t-1) in 
our empirical model. In such a framework, OLS results in inconsistent estimates 
since  CRIMEi,t-1 and ηi are necessarily correlated, even if the idiosyncratic 
component of the error term is serially uncorrelated. An obvious solution to 
these problems is to eliminate the term ηi by taking first-differences. However, 
OLS still does not consistently estimate the parameters of interest because first-
differencing introduces correlation between the lagged dependent variable and 
differenced error terms, i.e. CRIMEi,t-1 and εi,t are correlated trough the terms 
CRIMEi,t-1  and  εi,t-1. The alternative to first differences transformation is the 
within transformation; however, and although controlling for fixed effects, the 
within transformation leads to consistent estimates only under the hypothesis of 
strictly exogenous regressors. Third, it is unlikely that explanatory variables are 
strictly exogenous; the relationship between crime rates and their determinants is 
often characterized by a two-way causality. Fourth, it is very likely that crime 
data may be subject to measurement errors, which induce biases in the estimates. 
The econometric problems presented above suggest the use of an 
instrumental variables procedure applied to a dynamic model of panel data. This 
paper therefore employs the GMM estimator that uses the dynamic properties of 
the data to generate proper instrumental variables (Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
Arellano and Bover, 1995). The GMM technique allows to control for (weak) 
endogeneity by using the instrumental variables, which consist of appropriate 
lagged values of the explanatory variables. To deal with the fact that 
measurement errors are likely to be determined not only by random errors but by 
  10specific and persistent characteristics of each province we employ the GMM-
system estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) which 
joins into a single system the regression equation in both differences and levels. 
The consistency of the parameters obtained by means of the GMM 
estimator depends crucially on the validity of the instruments. We therefore 
consider two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Arellano and Bover (1995). The first test is the Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions, which tests the null hypothesis of overall validity of the instruments 
used. Failure to reject this null hypothesis gives support to the choice of the 
instruments. We also report the test for serial correlation of the error term, which 
tests the null hypothesis that the differenced error term is first and second order 
serially correlated. Failure to reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial 
correlation implies that the original error term is serially uncorrelated and the 




The results obtained from the regressions are presented in table 3 to table 5. 
Table 3 shows GMM estimates for the set of determinants of the overall number 
of criminal offences, defined as the sum of serious crimes and minor crimes, for 
each category of crime (property crime, crime against the person and total 
crime), while table 4 and 5 show GMM estimates for the same categories but 
differentiating between serious crimes (delitos) and minor crimes (faltas), 
respectively. 
The first column of each table provides the results for crimes against the 
person, the second column for property crimes, while the third one for total 
crimes. Four test statistics are reported: (i) the Wald test of joint significance of 
  11the time dummies; (ii) Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions; (iii) and (iv) 
first and second order serial correlation test. 
From the analysis of the results presented in table 3 emerges that the lagged 
crime rate, the percentage of males aged 15-29 and the clear-up rate have 
significant coefficients with the expected signs for all typologies of crimes 
considered (person, property and total). The unemployment rate also appears to 
be significantly correlated with crime rates but in a negative way. This result, 
even if not expected, is not surprising since the strength of the relationship 
between unemployment and crime is ambiguous both in its nature and in its 
robustness, as widely discussed in the previous section. The percentage of 
foreigners and the share of population living in provincial capital are not 
significant even if they display the expected signs. 
With regard to the GMM specification adopted all regression models are 
supported by the Sargan test, thus confirms that the instruments used are valid 
(i.e. the instruments used are not correlated with the error terms). As expected 
there is evidence for first-order serial correlation, while there is no evidence of 
second-order serial correlation, although for some models this test is significant 
but at a 90% level. Finally, time dummies are jointly significant in all the 
models estimated. 
As previously noticed, the significance of the lagged value of crime rate in 
all the estimated models indicates that the dynamic specification used is 
appropriate, giving evidence that there exists a persistence of crime over time in 
Spanish provinces. 
In the GMM estimates for property crime, the share of population with high 
school and university degree, the GDP per capita and the growth rate have 
significant coefficients with the expected sings. In our opinion this is due to the 
fact this typology of crime is more likely to depend on economic motivations 
than crime against the person or total crimes. 
 
  12Table 3 – GMM estimates: Overall Crimes (Serious Crimes + Minor 
Crimes) 
  PERSON PROPERTY  TOTAL 
      
Crimet-1 0.5949 0.7725  0.8016 
  (7.98)*** (11.5)***  (12.0)*** 
Foreign  0.0230 0.0486  0.0763 
  (1.43) (0.964)  (1.29) 
Capital  0.0007 0.0021  -0.0039 
  (0.723) (0.668)  (-0.922) 
YMale  0.0215 0.1422  0.1786 
  (2.54)** (2.72)***  (3.38)*** 
Edu  -0.0043 -0.0287  -0.0168 
  (-1.44) (-2.94)**  (-1.29) 
GDP  0.0002 0.0003  0.0002 
  (-0.733) (1.95)*  (1.09) 
Growth  0.0008 -0.0234  -0.0202 
  (0.211) (-2.06)**  (-1.61)* 
Unemp  -0.0033 -0.0113  -0.0120 
  (-2.37)** (-1.70)*  (-1.65)* 
Clear-up  -0.0001 -0.0299  -0.0140 
  (-0.103) (-5.81)***  (-1.89)* 
      
Wald (time)  0.000** 0.000**  0.000** 
Specification tests      
  Sargan test  0.229 0.451  0.459 
  Serial correlation      
   AR(1) test  0.358 0.004**  0.000** 
   AR(2) test  0.052 0.017*  0.162 
Note: First Order and Second Order Test are test statistics for first and second order 
autocorrelations in residuals, respectively, distributed as standard normal N(0,1) under the 
null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions, 
distributed as chi-square under the null hypothesis of validity of instruments. T-values are 
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
(Arellano, 1987). ***, ** and * indicate coefficient significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.. Estimations performed using GMM-system procedure combining transformed 
and level instruments. Variables instrumented: Crime, Education, GDP per capita, Growth, 
Unemployment, Clear-up rate. Time dummies are used. Number of observations = 322. Time 
span: 1993-1999. 
 
The results presented are partially confirmed when we take into account the 
difference between serious and minor crimes. As, widely discussed in the 
introduction pooling crime types into a single decision model may affect the 
  13significance and the robustness of the results. Considering separately serious 
crimes from minor crimes allows us to avoid aggregation bias and to better 
analyze crime determinants. 
Table 4 shows GMM estimates for serious crime. Lagged crime rate, 
percentage of males aged 15-29 and clear-up rate are significant and with the 
expected sign for serious property crimes and serious total crimes, while in the 
case of serious crimes against the person only lagged crime rate is significant. 
Serious total crime rate is significant and positively affected by the percentage 
of foreigners, as crimes against the person, and negatively by the GDP growth 
rate. Serious crimes against the person are even negatively and significantly 
correlated to the variable used to proxy education. The results for serious 
property crimes confirm that the socioeconomic factors play an important role 
for this typology of crime: GDP per capita, GDP growth rate and the share of 
population with high school and university degree are significant and with the 
expected signs. Unemployment is not significant for all the typologies of crime 
considered, this result, which differs from the previous estimate, confirms the 
frailty of the relationship between crime and unemployment. 
Finally, for minor crimes, (table 5), we obtain similar results to the 
previous models, indicating the robustness of the relationships between crime 
and its socioeconomic and demographic determinants. As presented in Section 
3, minor crimes against the person account for more than 90% of the overall 
number of crimes against the person for the period 1993 to 1999. Then 
disaggregating for minor crimes allows us to better determine which factors are 
related to this typology of crime. Lagged crime rates and clear-up rates have 
significant coefficients with the expected signs. Percentage of foreigners and 
males aged 15-29 are significantly and negatively correlated to minor crimes 
against the person, while share of population living in provincial capital has a 
positive and significant sign, as expected. These results confirm that 
demographic and deterrence determinants appear to be strongly correlated to 
  14crimes against the person, while property crimes are better explained by 
socioeconomic factors. 
 
Table 4 – GMM estimates: Serious Crimes 
  PERSON PROPERTY TOTAL 
      
Crimet-1 0.450 0.766  0.811 
  (5.50)*** (14.8)***  (22.2)*** 
Foreign  0.009 0.029  0.065 
  (5.98)*** (0.896) (2.72)** 
Capital  0.0001 0.001  -0.001 
  (0.045) (0.636)  (-0.514) 
YMale  0.0004 0.127 0.078 
  (0.226) (3.48)***  (2.28)** 
Edu  -0.001 -0.015  -0.007 
  (-1.77)* (-2.13)**  (-0.922) 
GDP  0.0001 0.0002  0.0001 
  (-0.215) (2.26)**  (0.708) 
Growth  0.0002 -0.020  -0.017 
  (0.486) (-3.02)**  (-2.37)** 
Unemp  -0.003 -0.004  -0.002 
  (-0.762) (-0.949)  (-0.722) 
Clear-up  -0.0005 -0.013 -0.007 
  (-1.37) (-3.79)***  (-2.08)** 
      
Wald (time)  0.000 **  0.000**  0.000** 
Specification tests      
  Sargan test  0.974 0.951  0.461 
  Serial correlation      
   AR(1) test  0.017* 0.001**  0.000** 
   AR(2) test  0.113 0.011*  0.014* 
Note: See notes to table 3. 
 
Summarizing, the main results are as follows. First, crime rates display 
persistence over time. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variables is 
between 0.5 and 0.8, confirming that crime rates show a sizeable degree of 
inertia. In particular, total crime rate show a bigger degree of inertia compared 
to property crime and crime against the person. 
  15Second, the clear-up rate is negatively and significantly correlated to crime 
rates. This variable allows us to capture the effect of deterrence and law 
enforcement, a higher level of crime cleared by police is associated with lower 
expected returns from crime. 
 
Table 5 – GMM Estimates: Minor Crimes 
  PERSON PROPERTY TOTAL 
Crimet-1 0.584 0.722  0.671 
  (8.09)*** (7.67)***  (7.05)*** 
Foreign  -2.94 0.017  0.058 
  (-2.82)*** (0.415)  (1.12) 
Capital  0.179 0.001  0.0002 
  (2.02)** (0.648) (0.069) 
YMale  -1.617 0.083 0.099 
  (-1.71)* (2.27)**  (2.49)** 
Edu  -0.166 -0.014  -0.008 
  (-0.703) (-1.55)  (-0.753) 
GDP  -0.006 0.0003  0.00003 
  (-1.95)* (2.00)** (0.224) 
Growth  0.299 -0.008  -0.005 
  (1.12) (-1.06)  (-0.657) 
Unemp  -0.035 -0.011  -0.012 
  (-0.278) (-2.25)**  (-2.41)** 
Clear-up  -0.160 -0.004  -0.009 
  (-1.66)* (-4.18)***  (-3.34)*** 
      
Wald (time)  0.000** 0.000**  0.000** 
Specification tests      
  Sargan test  0.981 0.948  0.967 
  Serial correlation      
   AR(1) test  0.039* 0.012*  0.001* 
   AR(2) test  0.296 0.085  0.410 
Note: See notes to table 3. 
 
Third, property crimes are better explained by socioeconomic variables 
(GDP per capita, GDP growth rate and percentage of population with high 
school and university degree), since this type of crime is more likely to be 
motivated by economic reasons than crimes against the person or total crimes. 
  16Instead, crimes against the person and in particular minor crimes are strongly 
correlated to sociodemographic factors. 





In this paper, we estimate a crime equation using a panel dataset of Spanish 
provinces for the period 1993 to 1999, employing the GMM-system estimator. 
Our analysis differs from previous studies of crime determinants in Spain for 
several reasons: 1) we use a provincial dataset; 2) we explicitly consider in our 
analysis demographic and urban factors; 3) we explicitly account for dynamics 
in criminal activities and 4) instead of using the overall crime rate to measure 
the level of criminal activity, we separate the crime measure into property 
crimes and crimes against the person and in serious crimes (called “delitos”) and 
in minor crimes (called “faltas”). 
Our analysis better performs for property crimes, that are more likely to 
depend on economic motivations than crimes against the person or total crimes; 
while only weak support can be observed for crimes against the person, that 
seem to be more correlated to sociodemographic factors. 
The main conclusions of this paper are that all the crime rates considered 
display persistence over time, implying that the incidence of crime appears to 
have inertial properties; the deterrence variable used (clear-up rate) is significant 
and negatively correlated to crime rate and the share of males aged 15-29 
positively affects the crime rates. 
Economic variables that are used to capture legal and illegal opportunities 
(GDP per capita, GDP growth rate and percentage of population with high 
school and university degree) perform as expected for property crimes. 
  17Demographic factors reveal important and significant influences, in 
particular for crimes against the person. Furthermore, our analysis confirms the 
ambiguous relationship between crime and unemployment, while there is no 
clear evidence that the share of foreigners and the urbanization rate are 
positively associated to crime, apart from minor crimes against the person.  
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